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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The significant issues raised by this case include
(1) the ability of courts with criminal jurisdiction to
provide remedies for constitutional errors at trial; (2)
the role played by Article III courts in providing
collateral relief for convictions obtained in state
courts, and in Article III and non-Article III federal
courts; (3) the specific interaction between Article I
military courts and Article III courts; and (4) the
applicability of the canon of statutory interpretation
disfavoring repeals of jurisdiction by implication.

Amici curiae, listed in Appendix A, are professors
teaching the law of federal jurisdiction, criminal
procedure, and post-conviction remedies. Amici join
together to provide the Court with their
understanding of the application of different strands
of the relevant jurisprudence to the lawfulness of the
potential relief—the writ of coram nobis—that the
Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces (CAAF) has
ordered to be considered for Respondent. Amici
share the view that the probable existence of a postconviction remedy in Article III courts does not
divest the military courts of their authority to resolve
1.

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Counsel of record for all parties received notice at least 10
days prior to the due date of amici curiae’s intention to file
this brief. No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole
or in part, and no counsel for a party nor a party itself made
a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or
submission of this brief. No person other than amici, its
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to its
preparation or submission.
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post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that would—if left unredressed—result in
the Respondent’s deportation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
At issue in this case is whether the courts of
appeals in the military justice system—including the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (CAAF) and
the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals
(N-MCCA)—have the power to issue writs of coram
nobis2 to respond to unlawful convictions. The CAAF
answered this question in the affirmative. See
Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114 (C.A.A.F.), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 622 (2008). Nonetheless, the
Government argues that because Article III courts
have authority under certain circumstances to hear
ineffective assistance of counsel claims such as those
presented by the Respondent, the military courts of
appeals do not.
In the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
Congress conferred upon the military courts
jurisdiction to conduct criminal proceedings via
courts-martial. As “courts established by Act of
2.

As an appellate court, the N-MCCA would fashion relief in
the form of a writ of coram vobis, rather than coram nobis.
See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 196 (1873). Like
the traditional distinction between common-law writs of
mandamus and prohibition, that semantic clarification is
“virtually meaningless” today. See United States v. Sawyer,
239 F.3d 31, 37 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001). See generally Note, The
Need for Coram Nobis in the Federal Courts, 59 YALE L.J.
786 (1950) (discussing the background and purpose of the
writ).
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Congress,” courts-martial and the military courts of
appeals are thereby authorized by the All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651, to “issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
Under this Court’s decision in United States v.
Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 512 (1954), that authority
includes the power to issue writs of coram nobis in
appropriate cases.
No Act of Congress provides to the contrary.
Article 76 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876, states only
that, upon the conclusion of direct appellate review,
“the proceedings, findings, and sentences of courtsmartial . . . are final and conclusive.” This provision
does not speak to the power of the military courts to
fashion collateral relief, and this Court disfavors
repeals of jurisdiction by implication. See, e.g.,
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 660 (1996) (citing Ex
parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1869)).
As Justice Powell explained in Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), “this canon of
construction applies with particular force when the
asserted repealer would remove a remedy otherwise
available.” Id. at 752. Councilman thus held that
Article 76 did not preclude collateral review of
courts-martial in the Article III courts, whether
through habeas corpus or other available remedies.
See id. at 749-51. Given that Congress and this
Court’s jurisprudence generally require exhaustion
of remedies in the courts (both Article III and nonArticle III) from which the convictions issued as a

4
predicate to Article III review, the Councilman
precept applies to the military justice system as well.
To require litigants to resort first to collateral
review in the Article III courts, rather than to postconviction remedies available in the court system in
which they were convicted, would be inconsistent
with the fabric of post-conviction remedies, as
developed under both state and federal case law and
statutes.
The exhaustion doctrine is based on
considerations of comity and pragmatism, as it posits
that the judicial system responsible for the
conviction is generally able and well-suited to
conduct the requisite post-conviction review. Such
collateral proceedings are especially critical in cases
raising ineffective assistance claims, which often
require fact-finding outside the record about a
lawyer’s
alleged
constitutionally
inadequate
representation. See Massaro v. United States, 538
U.S. 500 (2003).
The jurisprudence of exhaustion recognizes the
authority and utility of this sequencing in protecting
Article III courts from having to act when they need
not, thereby avoiding unnecessary decisions about
the administration of criminal justice by non-Article
III tribunals. Article III review remains available in
most cases as a necessary stopgap, but generally as
the last—rather than the first or only—resort.
Congress has not directed to the contrary, and,
absent a clear statement of congressional intent,
neither should this Court.
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ARGUMENT
I. THE POSSIBLE AVAILABILITY OF ARTICLE
III REVIEW IS NOT A BASIS FOR INFERRING
THAT
POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF
IS
UNAVAILABLE IN THE MILITARY COURTS.
A.

Article III Courts Have Jurisdiction to
Entertain
Collateral
Challenges
to
Convictions Obtained in Their Own Courts,
in State Courts, and in Non-Article III
Federal Courts, Including Courts-Martial.

Decisions by both this Court and the lower federal
courts consistently recognize the authority of the
Article III courts to entertain collateral attacks on
convictions rendered by courts-martial under the
UCMJ. The basis for such jurisdiction has varied
depending on the nature of the relief sought and
includes 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, 2201, and 2241.
See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 537
n.11 (1999) (recognizing authority under § 2241);
Davis v. Marsh, 876 F.2d 1446, 1448 & n.4 (9th Cir.
1989) (recognizing authority under § 2201); Baker v.
Schlesinger, 523 F.2d 1031, 1034-35 (6th Cir. 1975)
(recognizing authority under § 1361); United States
ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403, 406 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (recognizing authority under § 1331), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2096 (2007). See generally
Councilman, 420 U.S. at 746-48.3

3.

The Government states that remedies in the Article III courts
remain available to individuals in Respondent’s position. See
U.S. Br. at 34.
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More generally, Article III courts have
jurisdiction to entertain collateral challenges to
convictions rendered in their own courts, as well as
in state courts and non-Article III courts providing
criminal processes—including territorial courts, the
D.C. Superior Court, and the military justice system.
The prototype for such review is the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, the relevant provisions of which are
codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which,
together with the jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, provides the federal courts with jurisdiction
to hear challenges to state-court convictions.
Congress has authorized comparable review of
federal-court convictions through 28 U.S.C. § 2255;
prisoners “in custody under sentence of a court
established by Act of Congress” are authorized to file
motions for post-conviction relief in the sentencing
court that are functionally equivalent to habeas
corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 427-28 & n.5 (1962).4 Further,
in a statute modeled on § 2255, Congress has
provided for such review when a defendant is
convicted in the D.C. Superior Court. See D.C. CODE
§ 23-110; see also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
379-81 (1977).

4.

The text of § 2255 suggests that it may be invoked by any
“prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by
Act of Congress,” hence potentially including courts-martial.
Section 2255 has been interpreted as not being available to
court-martial defendants. See, e.g., Witham v. United
States, 355 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2004).
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B.

Under the All Writs Act, Article III Courts
Have Jurisdiction to Issue Writs of Coram
Nobis to Set Aside Convictions Rendered in
Their Own Trial Courts.

Article III courts have the power under the All
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to issue writs of coram
nobis to set aside federal convictions, as this Court
held in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502
(1954). See also United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55
(1914); Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1987).5 Although coram nobis is an unusual
remedy, it continues to have significance in a specific
class of cases:
The writ of coram nobis is an extraordinary
remedy available to a petitioner no longer in
custody who seeks to vacate a criminal
conviction in circumstances where the
petitioner can demonstrate civil disabilities as
a consequence of the conviction, and that the
challenged error is of sufficient magnitude to
justify the extraordinary relief.

United States v. Esogbue, 357 F.3d 532, 534 (5th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Ira P. Robbins, The Revitalization of the CommonLaw Writ of Audita Querela as a Postconviction
Remedy in Criminal Cases: The Immigration
Context and Beyond, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 643, 665-68
5.

The lower federal courts have not recognized the availability
of coram nobis in cases involving state-court judgments.
See, e.g., Finkelstein v. Spitzer, 455 F.3d 131, 133-34 (2d
Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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(1992) (summarizing circumstances in which post-

Morgan courts have found coram nobis relief
appropriate). See generally 2 Randy Hertz & James
S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure § 41.2b, at 1919-21 (5th ed. 2005). As

Judge Edwards has explained, “[t]he teaching of
Morgan is that federal courts may properly fill the
interstices of the federal post-conviction remedial
framework through remedies available at common
law.” United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 428
(D.C. Cir. 1990).

In Morgan, the Court rejected the Government’s
argument that the power to fashion coram nobis
relief was superseded by Congress’s 1948 provision of
collateral review in § 2255.6 Instead, Justice Reed
invoked the Court’s ruling in United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952), for the proposition
that § 2255 was intended to streamline habeas
corpus proceedings, while not precluding other forms
of collateral review. See 346 U.S. at 510-11 (citing
Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219).

Morgan is also thus part of a line of decisions

rejecting arguments that Congress has implicitly
divested the federal courts of their jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 533-34 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298-99
(2001); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas
6.

Morgan has particular relevance to this case in that it
recognized the appropriateness of coram nobis as a remedy
for violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. See 346 U.S. at 507-08, 511-12.

9

Corpus Suspension Clause After INS v. St. Cyr, 33
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 555 (2002). See generally
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance,
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1553-56 (2000) (noting

the relationship between the presumption against
implied repeals and the constitutional avoidance
canon).
C.

Congress
and
this
Court
Require
Defendants to Exhaust Available PostConviction Remedies in the Courts in
Which Their Conviction Originated Before
Seeking Collateral Article III Review.

The availability of collateral Article III review
does not constrain the scope of post-conviction
remedies in the judicial system in which the
conviction was obtained. State courts routinely
provide their own forms of collateral post-conviction
relief, including, in many jurisdictions, coram nobis.
See, e.g., 1 Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State
Postconviction Remedies and Relief Handbook § 2:4,
at 35 (2008-2009 ed.). Moreover, Congress and this
Court have not only recognized the availability of
such remedies but have generally required their
exhaustion before defendants may invoke the
collateral powers of the Article III courts. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (“An applicant shall not be
deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this
section, if he has the right under the law of the State
to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented.” (emphasis added)); see also Coleman v.

10

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). See generally Ex
parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
Post-conviction fact-finding stands in a special
relationship to a small set of collateral claims, of
which ineffective assistance of counsel is a leading
example. In Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500
(2003), which held that a defendant does not default
an ineffective-assistance claim by failing to raise it
on direct appeal, Justice Kennedy emphasized how,
“[u]nder the rule we adopt today, ineffectiveassistance claims ordinarily will be litigated in the
first instance in the district court, the forum best
suited to developing the facts necessary to
determining the adequacy of representation during
an entire trial.” Id. at 505; see also Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 24-26 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas,
73 MINN. L. REV. 247, 325 (1988).
As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Massaro,
many ineffective assistance cases turn on evidence
that is outside the trial record. See 538 U.S. at 50406; see also, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374
(2005) (granting habeas relief based upon the record
created in state post-conviction proceedings);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (same). To
that end, even where defendants are able to raise
such claims in a direct appeal, the lower federal
courts have suggested that an ineffective assistance
claim “is more appropriately raised through a postconviction motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.” United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364,
377 (6th Cir. 2008).

11
Post-conviction review in the courts in which the
conviction originated thus serves dual purposes: it
provides an opportunity for the defendant to
introduce evidence not in the trial record, and it
places initial adjudicatory responsibility in the same
courts in which the conviction was obtained. This
sequencing reflects the principle that collateral
remedies in the Article III courts come as the last
resort, rather than the first. In the most common
context, the purpose of this rule is to “protect the
state courts’ role in the enforcement of federal law
and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings.”
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982).
The background to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 reveals
another reason for such sequencing, predicated on
efficiency rather than federalism. The enactment of
§ 2255 was a response to the logistical problems
attendant to collateral review of federal convictions
in the 1940s. Then, federal prisoners were required
to seek habeas corpus relief in their district of
confinement. See, e.g., Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1948), overruled in part by Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir.
Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Because the
overwhelming majority of federal prisoners were
housed in five prisons, the rule placed the greatest
burden on five district courts. See Hayman, 342 U.S.
at 214 & n.18; see also Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 837, 904-07 (1984) (summarizing the
background); Robbins, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J., at 663-64
(same).
In addition to the volume of cases, those courts’
distance from the courts in which the defendants
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were sentenced created a separate set of
difficulties—in obtaining trial records or relevant
witnesses to testify at evidentiary hearings. See
Hayman, 342 U.S. at 212-14. Thus, as Chief Justice
Vinson explained,
the few District Courts in whose territorial
jurisdiction major federal penal institutions
are located were required to handle an
inordinate number of habeas corpus actions
far from the scene of the facts, the homes of
the witnesses and the records of the
sentencing court solely because of the
fortuitous concentration of federal prisoners
within the district.

Id. at 213-14.
To reduce these problems, Congress provided an
alternative to habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
requiring that defendants file motions for postconviction relief in the court in which they were
convicted. Congress thus provided that review under
§ 2255 would be in lieu of review under § 2241
“unless . . . the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [the defendant’s]
detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). As this Court
observed last Term, “[t]he purpose and effect of the
statute was not to restrict access to the writ but to
make postconviction proceedings more efficient. It
directed claims not to the court that had territorial
jurisdiction over the place of the petitioner’s
confinement but to the sentencing court, a court
already familiar with the facts of the case.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2264 (2008).
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D.

This Court Has Applied an Exhaustion
Requirement for Challenges to CourtMartial Convictions Parallel to That Which
Congress Has Required for Challenges to
Convictions in State and Federal Civilian
Courts.

Pragmatism
and
comity
have
produced
comparable requirements for the military system. In
Councilman and Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128
(1950), this Court applied the exhaustion principle to
the military justice system created by Congress. As
Justice Douglas explained in Gusik, requiring the
exhaustion of remedies in the military justice system
before resorting to the Article III courts serves
similar purposes as the exhaustion requirement for
state-court defendants. See 340 U.S. at 131-32; see
also id. at 132 (“If an available procedure has not
been employed to rectify the alleged error which the
federal court is asked to correct, any interference by
the federal court may be wholly needless.”).
Moreover, in Councilman, Justice Powell rejected
the general power of the Article III courts to conduct
ex ante habeas review of a court-martial.7 As he
explained,
[J]udgments of the military court system
remain subject in proper cases to collateral
7.

Councilman reaffirmed an important exception to the

exhaustion requirement—where defendants seek to
challenge their amenability to military jurisdiction in the
first place. See 420 U.S. at 758-59; see also Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 585 n.16 (2006); Noyd v. Bond, 395
U.S. 683, 696 n.8 (1969).
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impeachment.
But
implicit
in
the
congressional scheme embodied in the Code is
the view that the military court system
generally is adequate to and responsibly will
perform its assigned task. We think this
congressional judgment must be respected and
that it must be assumed that the military
court system will vindicate servicemen’s
constitutional rights. We have recognized this,
as well as the practical considerations common
to all exhaustion requirements, in holding that
federal courts normally will not entertain
habeas petitions by military prisoners unless
all available military remedies have been
exhausted.
420 U.S. at 758; see also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 142 (1953) (plurality) (“In military habeas
corpus cases, even more than in state habeas corpus
cases, it would be in disregard of the statutory
scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take
account of the prior proceedings—of the fair
determinations of the military tribunals after all
military remedies have been exhausted.”); cf. Khadr
v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 230 (D.D.C. 2008)
(noting the significance of “Councilman abstention”
in declining to entertain a pre-trial habeas petition
challenging a military commission).
As noted by the CAAF, see Denedo, 66 M.J. at
123 (citing cases), these precepts are the basis for
decisions of several district courts holding that the
court-martial defendants failed to exhaust their
available military remedies by failing to pursue
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coram nobis relief. See also Parker v. Tillery, No. 95-

3342-RDR, 1998 WL 295574, at *2 (D. Kan. May 22,
1998) (holding that coram nobis review in the
military justice system demonstrated full and fair
review of claim). In short, the pattern that emerges
is one in which, despite the different sources of law,
criminal defendants are first to seek post-conviction
relief in the courts responsible for the conviction.
II. THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
DOES NOT PRECLUDE COLLATERAL POSTCONVICTION REVIEW IN THE MILITARY
COURTS.
A.

Congress Authorized the Military Court
System to Enter Convictions and to Review
Them Collaterally.

Congress has empowered the military courts to
provide post-conviction remedies, both on appeal and
as a collateral matter. See Burns, 346 U.S. at 141
(plurality); see also Gusik, 340 U.S. at 131-32. In
Councilman, 420 U.S. at 753 & n.26, this Court
quoted with approval the decision of the CAAF’s
predecessor—the United States Court of Military
Appeals—in United States v. Frischholz, 36 C.M.R.
306 (C.M.A 1966), which upheld the power of the
military courts under the All Writs Act to issue writs
of coram nobis, even while denying the petitioner’s
claim on the merits. Id. at 308-09.
To similar effect is Noyd, which noted that
Frischholz “properly rejected the Government’s
argument” that the military courts of appeals are
powerless to provide collateral post-conviction relief.
395 U.S. at 695 n.7. Like state courts and non-
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Article III federal courts such as the territorial
courts and the D.C. Superior Court—if not more so—
the military’s judicial system is designed to function
as a complete whole, able both to provide all of the
procedural protections at trial required by the
Constitution and to provide remedies when those
protections go unobserved.
B.

The All Writs Act Supports the Jurisdiction
of the Military Courts of Appeals to Issue
Writs of Coram Nobis in Appropriate
Cases.

Relying upon Noyd and Councilman, the CAAF
has sustained its own jurisdiction to entertain
various applications for collateral relief, including
coram nobis and relief in the form of habeas corpus
under the All Writs Act. See Loving v. United
States, 62 M.J. 235, 246-47 (C.A.A.F. 2005). Such
analysis is consistent with the recognition of the
power of other non-Article III courts to exercise All
Writs Act authority. See, e.g., United States v.
Hamid, 531 A.2d 628 (D.C. 1987); see also United
States v. Cogdell, 585 F.2d 1130, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (upholding the D.C. Superior Court’s power
under the All Writs Act), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
This Court’s decision in Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526
U.S. 529 (1999), does not counsel to the contrary.
That decision held that the CAAF exceeded the scope
of its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act in affording
relief to an Air Force officer who claimed he had been
unlawfully dropped from the rolls. The power the
CAAF claimed there was not a power to correct a

17
constitutional error in a defendant’s court-martial,
but to correct executive action. As Justice Souter
explained, “the Air Force’s action to drop respondent
from the rolls was an executive action, not a
‘findin[g]’ or ‘sentence’ that was (or could have been)
imposed in a court-martial proceeding.” Id. at 535
(alterations in original; citation omitted); see also id.
at 536 (rejecting Goldsmith’s alternative argument
on the ground that he did not challenge his
conviction, but rather the “independent action” of
“another military agency”).
By contrast, the central feature of coram nobis is
to provide a means for an individual no longer in
custody to revisit a conviction in light of fundamental
claims that could not have been before the trial
court. Thus, ineffective assistance of counsel claims
present the paradigmatic case for coram nobis relief
because: (1) they depend on evidence not available
at trial; (2) they may not be properly cognizable in a
direct appeal, or the direct appeal may be timebarred by the time the relevant evidence is
uncovered; and (3) they go to the fundamental
fairness of the underlying proceeding—perhaps even
to the trial court’s jurisdiction.8
8.

As this Court has explained,
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles
one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel,
compliance with this constitutional mandate is an
essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal
court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938).
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Respondent here is no longer in the military and
does not request relief that would involve a court—
military or civilian—directing the military about how
to assign its personnel. Rather, the application for a
writ of coram nobis necessarily seeks to revise the
judgment of conviction—here, the “findings” or
“sentence” of a court-martial, a proceeding of the
military system that can now be reconsidered by the
military system. This review is otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the intermediate military courts of
appeals, including the N-MCCA, pursuant to Article
66 of the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(c). As such, and in
marked contrast to the relief sought in Goldsmith,
coram nobis is “in aid of” the N-MCCA’s jurisdiction
over the “findings” and “sentence” of Denedo’s courtmartial.
C.

No Act of Congress Divests the Military
Courts from Exercising Their Authority
Under the All Writs Act, Nor Should Such
Divestment Be Inferred by Implication.

Article 76 of the UCMJ provides that “the
proceedings, findings, and sentences of courtsmartial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as
required by this chapter, and all dismissals and
discharges carried into execution under sentences by
courts-martial following approval, review, or
affirmation as required by this chapter, are final and
conclusive.”
10 U.S.C. § 876.
This Court in
Councilman emphasized, however, that finality
under Article 76 is a prudential—rather than
jurisdictional—constraint.
See 420 U.S. at 749
(rejecting the argument that “Art. 76 was intended to
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bar subject-matter jurisdiction in suits for collateral
relief other than by way of habeas”). As Justice
Powell
explained,
“there
is
no
necessary
inconsistency between [the finality of a judgment
under Article 76] and the standard rule that void
judgments, although final for purposes of direct
review, may be impeached collaterally in suits
otherwise
within
a
court’s
subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Id.

Councilman rejected the argument that Article 76
preserved habeas corpus in the Article III courts
while eliminating other forms of collateral relief.
Instead, the Court concluded that “nothing in Art. 76
distinguishes between habeas corpus and other
remedies also consistent with well-established rules
governing collateral attack. If Congress intended
such a distinction, it selected singularly inapt
language to express it.” Id. at 751.
The text of Article 76 does not speak expressly to
the power of the military courts to fashion collateral
relief. It should not be read inferentially to divest
such jurisdiction. As this Court has made plain,
statutes are not to be presumed to repeal jurisdiction
by implication. See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 660 (1996) (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85, 105 (1869)). This “canon of construction
applies with particular force when the asserted
repealer would remove a remedy otherwise
available.” Councilman, 420 U.S. at 752. Thus,
while Congress could constitutionally limit the
jurisdiction of military courts to issue appropriate
post-conviction writs—at least as long as some other
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remedy remained available9—it did not do so in
Article 76.
D.

By Taking Responsibility for Correcting
Fundamental Errors in Courts-Martial, the
Military Courts Are Properly Discharging
Their Obligations in Relation to Article III
Courts.

Throughout the nearly six decades since the
UCMJ was enacted, this Court has accorded
deference “to the judgments of the carefully designed
military justice system established by Congress.”
Councilman, 420 U.S. at 753. Indeed, the limitations
on the substantive scope of Article III habeas review
of court-martial convictions articulated in Burns and
its progeny are explained by the “great care”
Congress has taken “both to define the rights of
those subject to military law, and provide a complete
system of review within the military system to
secure those rights.” Burns, 346 U.S. at 140
(plurality). As Justice Harlan described in Noyd,

9.

If eliminating coram nobis review in the military courts
would deprive litigants such as Respondent of any judicial
forum for resolution of their constitutional claims, it would
raise “serious constitutional questions.” See, e.g., Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128
S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (invalidating part of an Act of Congress
that effectively precluded habeas corpus review for noncitizens held as “enemy combatants”). See generally Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1731, 1777-807 (1991).
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When after the Second World War, Congress
became convinced of the need to assure direct
civilian review over military justice, it
deliberately chose to confide this power to a
specialized Court of Military Appeals, so that
disinterested civilian judges could gain over
time a fully developed understanding of the
distinctive problems and legal traditions of the
Armed Forces.
395 U.S. at 694; see also id. at 695 (rejecting the
possibility
that
“civilian
courts
intervene
precipitately into military life without the guidance
of the court to which Congress has confided primary
responsibility for the supervision of military justice
in this country and abroad”). The proposition that
Article III review strips CAAF and the N-MCCA of
their jurisdiction to provide collateral relief thus gets
the relationship between the Article I military
judicial system and the Article III courts backwards.
Neither this Court nor Congress has used the
availability of Article III redress as a predicate to an
absolute bar on a non-Article III court from
fashioning appropriate post-conviction relief, and for
good reason.
To adopt a position of implied
jurisdiction stripping based upon the availability of
Article III courts would put the onus on the Article
III courts to serve as courts of first impression for
claims like those brought by the Respondent. See
generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress

To Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1387-89

(1953) (highlighting the difficulties inherent in
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requiring habeas courts to resolve factual issues as a
matter of first impression). Given the military
courts’ familiarity with the specific case, the
background issues, and the nature of court-martial
proceedings more generally, such a rule would be as
impracticable as it would be unwise. Thus, “[t]here
seems little reason to blaze a trail on unfamiliar
ground when the highest military court stands ready
to consider [Respondent’s] arguments.” Noyd, 395
U.S. at 696.
CONCLUSION
For
the
aforementioned
reasons,
amici
respectfully submit that the decision of the CAAF be
affirmed.
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